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Abstract 
This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior 
of bidders in Best Value or multi-attribute construction auctions, where both the (dollar) bid 
and technical non-price criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of 
Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are 
influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score 
weighting, bid scoring formula and abnormally low bid criterion are variables likely to 
influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative 
bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring 
rules and their magnitude on bidders’ competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer 
to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to 
achieve the owner’s desired strategic outcomes. 
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Introduction 
Competitive bidding is the regular procurement method for many goods and services. 
Moreover, the requirement to ensure transparency, publicity and equality of opportunity in 
public procurement, means that clear procedures have to be followed by bidders (de Boer et 
al. 2001; Falagario et al. 2012; Panayiotou et al. 2004) to minimize the risk of unfair bias or 
corruption (Auriol 2006; Celentani and Ganuza 2002; Csáki and Gelléri 2005). 
The traditional means of doing this is by the lowest bid auction, which assumes that the 
lowest (most competitive) bid is the best for the owner and therefore wins the auction 
(Ioannou and Leu 1993; Waara and Bröchner 2006; Wang et al. 2006). The lowest bid 
auction method provides the best incentive for cost reduction (Bajari and Tadelis 2001) and 
dominates both the public and private sectors in the United States (e.g. Art 
Chaovalitwongse et al. 2012; Shrestha and Pradhananga 2010), European Union (e.g. 
Bergman and Lundberg 2013; Rocha de Gouveia 2002) and many countries worldwide.  
However, despite of its common use, the lowest bid auction method is considered by 
many to be a recipe for trouble (e.g. Holt et al. 1994a; Latham 1994; Williams 2003), 
especially when there is little work around and bidders are shaving their bids (Hatush and 
Skitmore 1998; Ioannou and Leu 1993; Oviedo-Haito et al. 2014). In fact, many previous 
studies point to the lowest bid often not being best bid in terms of final cost (Dawood 1994; 
Hatush and Skitmore 1998; Wong et al. 2001), time (Lambropoulos 2007; Shen et al. 2004; 
Shr and Chen 2003), quality (Asker and Cantillon 2008; Choi and Hartley 1996; Molenaar 
and Johnson 2003), or risk (Finch 2007). 
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In the construction sector, selection of the best price-quality bid in the form of Best 
Value auctions, also known as multi-attribute, multi-dimensional or two-envelope auctions 
(David et al. 2006; Karakaya and Köksalan 2011), has been promoted for a long time 
(Erickson 1968; Simmonds 1968). In Best Value auctions, bidders' proposals comprise two 
parts or envelopes: the economic (dollar) bid and the technical proposal, which contains 
purely non-price features. This way an optimum outcome (Choi and Hartley 1996; Wang et 
al. 2013) or the best value for money (Holt et al. 1995) is obtained for the owner, as the 
engineer seeks to maximize benefits for a certain dollar budget. 
Traditionally in many countries, the engineer is both the auctioner (the agent who 
designs the auction rules and decides how the contract is to be awarded) and the auctioneer 
(the agent that implements the auction rules and awarding process) (Chen 2013). Therefore, 
the engineer is usually in charge of designing the scoring rules, which enable both the bids 
and technical proposals to be rated and ranked in order to select the best bidder 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2012a, 2012b). The term ‘Bid Scoring Formula (BSF)’ (also 
named Economic Scoring Formula) is used here to refer to the set of scoring rules that 
transform a bid into a bid score (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2012b; 2015b; 2015c), while 
‘Technical Scoring Formula (TSF)’ denotes the set of scoring rules that transform a 
bidder’s technical proposal into a technical score. Each are then weighted by a respective 
weighting factor and the sum of the weighted bid score and weighted technical score 
provides the final overall score that determines the best bidder. 
Having clarified this, the aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the 
BSF and competitive bidding behavior by means of a BSF dataset gathered in the Spanish 
construction industry. This is done by monitoring variations of the BSF subcomponents, 
called Scoring Parameters, in multiple auctions with similar characteristics. 
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The paper is divided into six remaining sections. The next section presents a literature 
review. This is followed by a section detailing the methodological elements needed to 
analyze the changes in bidding behavior associated with different BSF configurations. The 
fourth, fifth and sixth sections provide the calculations, results and validation tests. The last 
section, entitled “Discussion and Conclusions”, closes the paper in providing further 
insights into the problem analyzed. 
 
Literature Review 
The Bid Scoring Formula (BSF) is a mathematical expression that translates bids for an 
auction into scores. The BSF can also encompass another mathematical expression that 
determines which bids are abnormal or risky (Abnormally Low Bids Criterion, ALBC) 
when the engineer wants to set an approximate threshold beyond which bids will be 
disqualified (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2012a, 2012b). 
However, despite extensive research on competitive bidding over the years (see Holt  
(2010) for a recent review), BSF selection remains a relatively poorly researched area. With 
very few exceptions, such as Dini et al. (2006) and Asker and Cantillon (2008, 2010), little 
has been done to bridge the gap between the theoretical analysis of scoring rules and their 
practical application in procurement practice (Bergman and Lundberg 2013). Likewise, 
abnormal (or unrealistically aggressive bidding) has also received very little attention in the 
literature to date (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2013b, 2015b; Chao and Liou 2007; Hidvégi et al. 
2007; Skitmore 2002). 
Therefore, very little is known of the relationship between BSFs and bidder behavior. 
As a result, BSF selection by auctioneers in practice is invariably a highly intuitive and 
subjective process (Holt et al. 1994a, 1994b) involving few theoretical or empirical 
5 
 
considerations. This produces scoring rules that are often poorly designed (Bergman and 
Lundberg 2013) and affected by internal consistency and validity problems (Borcherding et 
al. 1991). Likewise, the allocation of weights to the bid and technical components of a 
proposal (which must be disclosed in the Request For Proposals) are generally based on 
subjective judgments (Lorentziadis 2010). Fixed criterion weights are often used, therefore, 
to ensure objectivity and reduce the risk of unfairness and corruption in the evaluation of 
proposals, providing they accurately reflect the relative importance of the evaluation factors 
of the engineer (Falagario et al. 2012). However, it is still possible to create an unfair 
evaluation system in which too much emphasis is placed on particular evaluation factors 
(Rapcsák et al. 2000) thus favoring, intentionally or otherwise, those bidders that score 
highly in these corresponding factors (Vickrey 1961). 
Hence, at present, there is increasing attention paid to the criteria and weightings used 
to assess the dollar bids and associated technical proposals (Jennings and Holt 1998; 
Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy 2000). Nevertheless, there is as yet no regular prevailing 
method for assessing dollar bids or technical proposals for Best Value. Engineers 
frequently use the same BSF for all projects, but different engineers generally favor 
different BSFs (Ioannou and Leu 1993; Rocha de Gouveia 2002). 
The European Union has addressed this issue (Bergman and Lundberg 2013; Rocha de 
Gouveia 2002),  and the dubious actions taken by overly aggressive bidders to recover their 
subsequent losses – a recurring theme in the theoretical literature from as long ago as 1971 
(Capen et al. 1971). In 1993, the European Union stated that quality was as important as 
price (European Union 2002), incorporating this into Directive 93/97/EEC which, for the 
first time, allowed an auction to be awarded to the Best Value bidder (Rocha de Gouveia 
2002). Nevertheless, only since 1999 have clear recommendations been made for a more 
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methodical, consistent and auditable appraisal of auctions to meet the Best Value criterion 
(Carter and Stevens 2007; Rocha de Gouveia 2002). These aim to remedy the shortcomings 
of the traditional lowest bid criterion by discouraging the undesirable effects of unrealistic 
or abnormally aggressive bids on the industry (Conti and Naldi 2008; Crowley and Hancher 
1995). 
However, the difficulty for researchers is that longitudinal data concerning bids and 
profit from individual bidders are limited due to confidentiality and competitive issues. 
Therefore, empirical analysis has been severely restricted to a small number of cases 
(Vanpoucke et al. 2014), the main conclusion to date being that the decision to bid 
aggressively or conservatively is very “complex” (Carter and Stevens 2007). 
Hence, despite the current number of theoretical models from the economic theory of 
auctions, there is still a lack of fieldwork concerning the extent to which engineers are able 
to influence bidder competitiveness. The difficulties in obtaining appropriate data generally 
prevent any convincing conclusions to be reached. However, the use of Best Value auctions 
calls for the implementation of scoring rules in which both bid and technical criteria are 
involved. This situation provides an opportunity to examine how the responses of bidders 
change under a variety of scoring auction rule configurations. This is the point of departure 
of this research, which aimed to shed more light on this complex issue by examining 
evidence of the effect of different BSFs on bidder competitiveness. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Methodology Outline 
Before studying how economic auction rules affect bidding competitiveness, it is necessary 
to state the problem in a way that will allow an effective analysis. First, an auction X is 
7 
 
taken to exhibit a higher level of bidding aggressiveness compared to an auction Y when 
these two conditions occur simultaneously: 
1. The average bid for auction X is proportionally lower than its estimated cost than 
for auction Y. 
2. The lowest bid for auction X is proportionally lower than its average bid than for 
auction Y. 
This means that, when comparing the results of two auctions X and Y of different 
economic sizes (e.g., different average bid values), the only way to be certain that X is 
more competitive than Y (i.e., X evidences more aggressive bidding) is by knowing that the 
ratio of their respective bid average and estimated cost is lower for auction X and the ratio 
between the lowest bid and the average bid is also lower for X. Fulfilling only one of the 
conditions – such as one auction having a proportionally lower average bid with the other 
having a proportionally lower lowest bid - makes it uncertain which is more competitive. 
On the other hand, an auction X is defined as having a higher level of bid dispersion 
compared to auction Y if the following three conditions occur simultaneously: 
1. the lowest bid is proportionally lower in auction X than in auction Y, 
2. the highest bid is proportionally higher in auction X than in auction Y, and 
3. the bid standard deviation is proportionally higher in auction X than in auction Y. 
This case is easier to understand, since an auction X will inevitably have a higher bid 
dispersion – equivalent to a lower bid concentration – compared to an auction Y, which 
might also have a different economic size, when the relative proportional distances between 
the highest bid/average bid, the average bid/lowest bid and the bid standard 
deviation/average bid are simultaneously higher in auction X. 
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Therefore, the variations of the relative values of estimated cost, bid average, lowest 
bid, highest bid and bid standard deviation are the key variables to be monitored. These are 
named here Scoring Parameters, since they coincide with the variables usually found in 
BSFs. For instance, examples of BSFs commonly found in practice are: 
minmax
max
bb
bb
S ii



 
   
i
i
b
b
S min    
s
bsb
S imi
6
3 
  
Where iS  is the bid score (expressed on a scale of 0 to 1) produced by bidder i’s bid ( ib
) in an auction, where minb , mb , maxb  and s  are the minimum bid (lowest bid), the average 
(mean) bid, the maximum (highest) bid and the bid standard deviation respectively of an 
auction (see “Notation List”). 
 
Scoring Rules Dataset 
The dataset analyzed comprises 124 auction specification documents with 47 different 
groups of BSFs and ALBC for different Spanish owners, and enough auction data to enable 
a first quantitative analysis to be made. This is displayed in Table 1 and the terminology 
used will be explained later. The data are quite representative of the Spanish bidding 
system, as they comprise auctions from public authorities (city councils, local councils, 
semi-public entities, universities, ministries, etc.) and private companies. 
The dataset spans 5 years. Ideally, a good dataset should comprise as many auctions as 
possible within the shortest time. However, in order to be representative of the wide variety 
of scoring rules applied by many organizations, many of which are national bodies and do 
not regularly conduct construction auctions, it has been necessary to extend this time to 5 
years (2003-2008). The period chosen seems to be in line with other similar auction 
datasets; for example, a very recent study making use of twelve international auction 
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datasets for modeling the number of bidders in construction auctions (Ballesteros-Pérez et 
al. 2015a) spanning from 2 to 10 years, making our 5-year scoring rule dataset length quite 
reasonable. Spain enjoyed a period of economic prosperity from approximately 1997 to 
2008 and hence the dataset is not expected to be influenced by a volatile market. As is seen 
later in the “Test of the Model” section, as soon as market conditions change, the bidders’ 
behavior also gradually changes too. Seven more Spanish auctions from 2009 and 2010 – a 
period in which the European Union and Spanish economic recession began – are 
compared to the model developed for the first 124 auctions, showing that bidders in an 
economic downturn tend to be more aggressive in situation of work scarcity. 
The 124-auction dataset comprises a wide range of civil works (irrigation systems, 
desalination and waste water treatment plants, drinking water treatment stations and water 
supply systems, sewage lines and pumping stations, libraries, landfill sites, and small road 
networks) together with operation and maintenance services (dams, airports, touristic 
beaches, waste management, cinema studios, hospitals, seaports, amusement parks, 
university technological equipment) all involving construction or reconstruction activities 
to some extent. The more recent seven-auction dataset comprises buildings and hydraulic 
civil work auctions. 
 
Terminology 
For the sake of clarity, several terms used later are defined first. Each group of n auctions 
under the 47 different combinations of BSFs and ALBC in the 124 dataset is classified as 
what are called ‘capped tenders’ (in British English) or ‘capped auctions’ (in American 
English). In this form of auction, the engineer sets an upper bid limit (A) (sometimes also 
called ceiling price), which is stated in the auction specifications and against which bidders 
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must underbid. That is, in capped auctions, bidders offer a ‘drop’ ( id ) from the bid limit 
(A). The relationship between the monetary bids ( ib ) and drops ( id ) in these auctions is 
straightforward as 
 
A
b
d ii 1  (1) 
Therefore, in capped auctions, bids can be equally analyzed as monetary bids ( ib
ranging from 0 to A) or as drops ( id  ranging from 0 to 1 or, equally, from 0% to 100%). In 
uncapped auctions – auctions in which the engineer does not set a maximum or a minimum 
price and in which bidders can freely submit the bids they want – the bids can only be 
expressed as monetary bids ( ib ), since there is no set limit from which calculate the drop. 
It is quite usual that some countries use the capped bidding approach while others resort 
to the uncapped approach. However there is a large number of countries that adopt both 
approaches depending on their respective traditions, preferences or specific needs 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2010). In this case, capped bidding is used more frequently 
whenever there is a previous and well-developed project that clearly defines the scope of 
the works to be carried out. On the other hand, when the request for proposals invites the 
bidders to submit a bid for the design, build and sometimes the operation of the works 
auctioned, it is often more convenient to resort to uncapped bidding since the scope of work 
is less defined. 
Here, for the comparison of bids in different auctions with different initial upper limits 
(A), it is preferable to use drops rather than monetary-based bids, although the results are 
not expected to be different for uncapped auctions. Using drops always also has the 
advantage of involving the same 0 to 1 scale for analyzing the scoring parameter variations 
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and therefore also range from 0 to 1 when expressed in drops, since the bidders’ drops ( id ) 
themselves also range within that interval of variation (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2014). 
Therefore, the Scoring Parameters of mean bid, maximum bid, minimum bid and bid 
standard deviation can be expressed either in monetary-based values (bm, bmax, bmin and s, 
ranging from 0 to A) or in their respective drop-based version in capped auctions (dm, dmin, 
dmax and σ, ranging from 0 to 1 and obtained replacing the bm, bmin, bmax and s values 
respectively in Equation 1 when the auction maximum price limit A has been set). 
Furthermore, there are four aspects of scoring methods that can be analyzed 
(Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015c): (a) the way the bid score is calculated (BSF); (b) the way 
the technical score is calculated (TSF); (c) the way the weights the bid and the technical 
scores are set; and (d) how the ALBC is defined. Since this paper only focuses the on the 
bid score, (b) is ruled out, and the three main variables become the BSF, bid score 
weighting and ALBC. Table 1 shows these three variables for the dataset under study. From 
right to left these are the Bid Scoring Formulas (BSF), ALBC width (tk), and bid weighting 
(wk). The latter represents the weight of the bid score (with 10  kw ) versus the technical 
score (which generally equals kw1 ) in a multi-attribute or Best Value auction. The former 
is related to the unique generic mathematical expression of ALBC found in the dataset, 
which is   mkabn btb  1  (in monetary bids) or, alternatively,   mkabn dtd  111  
(when expressed in drops by means of replacing in the former variables bm and babn by 
 Adm1  and  Adabn1  respectively according to Equation 1). This is the most common 
mathematical expression in use in European Union countries for setting a cut-off limit 
beyond which all bids are ineligible. The variable abnb  (dabn) denotes the abnormal bid 
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(drop) threshold value below (above) which every bid ib  (di) is disqualified; whereas 
variable tk (ALBC width) is a parameter set by the engineer for a BSF in many ways –
Belgium, France, Italy and Spain, for example, use ranges mostly varying between tk=0.10 
and 0.15) (European Union 1999). As will be seen later, both wk and tk variables are 
important parameters for promoting bidding competitiveness. 
<Table 1> 
 
Scoring Parameter Relationships 
The bid scoring rules comprise, in addition to the weighting factor, two mathematical 
expressions: (1) the Bid Scoring Formula (BSF), which are expressions similar to the ones 
shown in Table 1 formulated as a function of bidder i’s bid bi (or di when expressed in 
drops) and generally with at least one or more Scoring Parameters (bm, bmax, bmin and s, in 
monetary bids, or, analogously, in drops, dm, dmin, dmax and σ, respectively); and (2) the 
Abnormally Low Bids Criteria (ALBC) which are the mathematical expression of a cut-off 
limit beyond which, any bid bi, or its equivalent drop di, are no longer eligible. The first 
converts the bids bi (or di) into scores, whereas the ALBC determines which bids are ex-
ante ineligible as being too cheap or too expensive. 
Now, the mathematical expressions of almost all BSFs and ALBC are defined by a 
combination of one or more Scoring Parameters (SP): bm, bmax, bmin and s, or dm, dmin, dmax 
and σ (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015c), which are variables that are only known after the 
auction has taken place and the price bids are known. Hence, these SP constitute, at the 
same time, a descriptive set of auction bid statistics (average, minimum, maximum and 
standard deviation) to calculate the bidders’ scores. 
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Therefore, if the variations of these individual SP can be traced with respect to the BSF 
and ALBC settings, it is possible to identify when an auction is more 
aggressive/conservative and more concentrated/dispersed. For example, translating what 
was said in the “Methodology Outline”, an auction X is more aggressive than another 
auction Y when the ratios bo/bm (equivalent to dm/do) and bmin/bm (equivalent to dmax/dm) are 
lower for auction X, where bo and do are the estimated cost of the auction expressed in 
money or drops, respectively. Analogously, an auction X evidences a higher level of bid 
dispersion when these three ratios: bmin/bm, bmax/bm and s/bm (or equivalently in drops 
dmax/dm, dmin/dm and σ/dm) are larger in auction X compared to auction Y. 
The problem is that these SP ratios do not follow a linear relationship, because the SP 
variation itself is not generally linear either; thus, its relative variations must be carefully 
measured and compared. This is the aim of the present section, describing the major 
features of the SP and how they are interconnected with each other, so their relative 
variations can be properly registered and used later for linking them to more 
aggressive/conservative bidding behavior and to a higher concentration/dispersion of bids. 
Therefore, as noted above, in both uncapped and capped auctions, the Scoring 
Parameters have particular mathematical relationships with each other; however, from now 
on, only SP relationships expressed in drops will be considered. These relationships are 
described and justified in Ballesteros-Pérez et al. (2012a, 2013a, 2015c) and, when they are 
expressed as a function of the scoring parameter mean drop (dm), they are as described in 
the first column of Figure 1. As can be seen, each of these expressions is known when the 
respective ‘regression coefficients’ (, ,  and , respectively by rows) is determined. 
<Figure 1> 
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Specifically, these four regression coefficients have the following meanings: 
  relates the estimated cost (do) to the mean bid (dm) when expressed in drops. The 
larger this coefficient is, the larger the mean drop will be compared to the estimated 
cost (aggressive bidding); whereas the smaller is , the mean drop will also be smaller 
(more conservative bidding). 
   relates the mean bid (dm) to the maximum drop (dmax). The larger this coefficient is 
in a particular auction, the closer is dmax to dm , meaning more conservative bidding. We 
therefore use ‘  ’ instead of ‘  ’, because ‘  ’ will be read the same way as  is 
read (the larger   denoting more aggressive bidding). This coefficient also indirectly 
means the concentration/dispersion of bids, since the distance between the lowest and 
the average value of bids indicates how dispersed the bids are. 
   is a very similar coefficient to ‘  ’, sharing the same mathematical expression, but 
relating the highest bid (lowest or minimum drop dmin) to dm. The larger   is, the 
further dmin will be located from dm and vice versa. Thus, this coefficient allows analysis 
of the concentration (with small   values) or dispersion (with large   values) of a bids 
in the same way as coefficient  . 
  connects the bids standard deviation ( ) with the mean bid (dm), but is expressed in 
drops. Again, the bigger is  , the greater is the dispersion of bids. 
The expressions for calculating the ‘regression coefficient averages’ ( , ,   and  ) 
are shown in the second column of Figure 1; further details and justification of the 
regression coefficient mathematical expressions can be found in Ballesteros-Pérez et al 
(2015c). These expressions are formulated as a function of the scoring parameter values 
obtained for the number of n auctions in Table 1 (the complete auction data having not been 
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displayed for the sake of brevity), which share the same BSF description (coded as ID in 
Table 1). The ‘regression coefficient averages’, however, are presented in the last four 
columns of Table 3, while a numerical example is also given in Table 2. 
The third and last column in Figure 1 displays how each regression coefficient average 
potential value is associated with different levels of bidding aggressiveness and/or 
dispersion. In particular, each graph represents how different intervals of the regression 
coefficient values produce different curves. These indicate how the relative distances or 
ratios between do, dmax, dmin or σ, respectively, to dm, evolve. Table 2 shows a numerical 
example detailing how the four average regression coefficients are calculated according to 
the second column of Figure 1 for a particular BSF (BSF ID=1 from Table 1) with two 
auctions (n=2). 
<Table 2> 
All the variables used in Table 2 have been introduced above with, as noted earlier, do 
corresponding to the estimated cost for each auction expressed in drops. This value was 
given by the same bidder for each of the 124 auctions, i.e., unlike dmax, dm, dmin and σ, it 
cannot be derived from the list of bids submitted by the bidders in each auction. 
In short, these ‘regression coefficient averages’ are important as they are the variables 
whose variations allow the comparisons between pairs of scoring parameters, which allows 
us to compare more aggressive with more conservative bidding (and more dispersed bids 
with more concentrated bids), for different auctions with different BSFs as stated in the 
“Methodology Outline” sub-section. 
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Hypotheses 
The strategy is to study how different BSF features affect the ‘regression coefficient 
average’ values of  ,  ,   and  . In doing this, coefficient   will be replaced by  , 
since this better aligns its direction of variation with the rest of scoring parameters. 
The central block in Table 3 (second to fourth columns) presents the three variables 
most influential on the regression coefficient averages: the bid weighting ( kw ), ALBC 
width ( kt ) and the BSF (simplified by its gradient kg ) (Ballesteros-Pérez et al. 2015c). As 
explained earlier, the value of kw indicates the importance of the bid (Si) relative to the 
technical proposal (Ti). It ranges from 0 (when the engineer is only interested in the 
technical proposal) to 1 (when the engineer is only interested in the bid value: an auction 
where the only selection mechanism is the highest drop or lowest bid). When 10  kw , the 
proposals are evaluated according to a mixture of economic (bid) and technical criteria.  
<Table 3> 
The ALBC width is a measurement of how narrow the cut-off for unrealistic ineligible 
bids is in terms of relative distance, kt , from the mean drop dm. Usual values found for this 
variable in European Union countries range from 0.04 to 0.25 whenever an ALBC is 
implemented. Otherwise, when there is no ALBC (∄ tk), kt  is considered as 1 (cut-off 
always at zero). 
Finally, the BSF gradient is concerned with the bidders' perception of how quickly they 
score reduces as a function of how far apart they are from the best-scored bid (theoretically 
from the first ranked bidder, see last column of Figure 2). This is easily visualized by 
plotting the Si curve for an auction. However, the interest is really in the shape of the curve: 
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(1) a concave curve indicating the bid score reduction is larger near the best bid; (2) a 
convex curve indicating the bid score reduction is smaller near the best bid; and (3) a linear 
curve indicating the bid score reduction is constant no matter what the distance to the best 
bid. 
<Figure 2> 
The expectation now is that, with a higher bid score weighting ( kw ), bidders will bid 
lower (with bigger drops) in order to win the auction as they have less possibility of gaining 
any advantage through having a superior technical proposal. Similarly, when the ALBC 
width is wide (larger values of kt ) and excludes very few bidders, bidder behavior is 
expected to be more aggressive since there is less chance of being disqualified for bidding 
too low. Analogously, concerning the BSF gradient, bidders whose di values are close to 
the maximum drop dmax, are more likely to compete strongly whenever they feel that their 
score will be reduced even though their bids are quite similar; this only happens with 
concave BSF gradients. This increased bidding aggressiveness for auctions with a specific 
combination of kw , kt  and kg  values will therefore be demonstrated for a set of auctions if 
the   and   values are larger than for auctions with different kw , kt  and kg  values. 
 
Calculations 
In order to validate and measure the extent to which conservative-aggressive bidding is 
actually influenced by the three independent variables of bid score weighting kw  (now X1), 
ALBC width kt  (now X2), and BSF gradient (now X3), that is, to what extent different 
values of X1, X2 and X3 can alter the values of  ,  ,   and  , four multiple linear 
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regression analyses are carried out (one for each ‘regression coefficient average’:  ,  , 
  and  , as a function of the three independent variables X1, X2 and X3 identified above). 
The aim of this approach is to determine if the regression coefficient averages ( ,  ,   
and  , now dependent variables Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4, respectively) are actually conditioned by 
the three variables X1, X2 and X3, whose test results of their interdependence will be 
presented later in Figure 3 as Covariation and Correlation matrices. 
To do this, we use a simple trichotomic scoring (-1, 0, +1) as in Figure 2, according to 
particular pre-set levels by rows of the three independent variables involved. In particular, 
possible values of  independent variable X1 ( kw ) are divided into three equally wide 
intervals each of which depicts the situation of a bid up to 33.3%, 66.7% and 100.0% 
respectively of the overall score (technical + bid) since this variable can range from 0 to 
100%. Independent variable X2 ( kt ) variation is divided again into three intervals. In this 
case however, despite kt  also theoretically ranging from 0 to 1, the usual values 
implemented in European Union countries range from 0.00 to 0.25 as noted above, so it 
was found preferable to adapt the three intervals to the most common range of actual kt  
values found in practice ( kt  up to 0.05, 0.15 and 1.00). Finally, independent variable X3 ( kg ) 
was directly classified according to the three only possible shapes the BSF curve can have: 
concave, convex or constant (linear). 
This way, according to the three main column values shown in the second and central 
block of Table 3, the trichotomic scoring for variables X1, X2 and X3 can be assigned 
according to the three levels from Figure 2, whereas the results of this assignment to the 
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three independent variables kw , kt  and kg  is shown on the right block of Table 3 in 
columns ‘X1’, ‘X2’ and ‘X3’, respectively. 
Analogously, the regression coefficient average values for  ,  ,   and  , are 
shown on the right block of Table 3 in columns Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4, respectively. These are 
calculated according to the expressions shown in Figure 1 (column ‘Calculation’) and as 
exemplified in Table 2 for each different set of n auctions with the same ID from Table 1. 
Independent variables kw  and kt  are ratios from 0 to 1 and, therefore, they could be 
used as continuous variables. However, the four multivariate analyses performed here opted 
instead for three-level categorical variables. The reason is that preliminary analyses (not 
included here due to lack of space) indicated non-linear contributions of kw  and kt . 
Unfortunately, non-linear analyses usually require far more data when the contribution of 
each independent variable is still to be researched, and the present dataset is not extensive 
enough to allow such an extensive analysis. However, the adopted three-level system 
equally allows two important aspects to be analyzed: the degree of contribution of each 
independent variable ( kw , kt  and kg ) as well as the direction in which each variable 
influences bidding behavior. Both facets are of primary importance in providing the first set 
of results and concluding where future research is still required. 
 
Results 
The results of the four regression analyses performed – one for each dependent variable, 
that is, Y1 (coefficient  ), Y2 (coefficient  ), Y3 (coefficient  ) and Y4 (coefficient  ) – 
are shown in Figure 3 arrayed horizontally, along with other intermediate calculations. 
However, the most representative results are the coefficients of determination (R
2
) and 
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significance tests for each Yi’s multiple linear regression coefficient (Mi), both checked as a 
group (M0 to M3 together passing the F-Fisher test) and individually (each Mi  passing the 
Student t-test). The covariance and correlation matrices are also provided at the bottom of 
Figure 3. 
< Figure 3> 
Summarizing the results of Figure 3, four major conclusions can be stated. First, all the 
coefficients of determination (R
2
) in Figure 3 are large enough to indicate that there is a 
moderate or high degree of correlation between the independent variables selected (X1= kw
, X2= kt and X3= kg ) and each of the dependent variables (Y1= , Y2=  , Y3=   and 
Y4= ). This means that the bid score weighting ( kw ), ALBC width ( kt ) and BSF gradient 
( kg ) are correctly identified as significant and influential variables. 
Second, the multiple linear regression coefficient values M1, M2 and M3 (but for the 
coefficient M3 when relating ‘Y3= ’) are positive, meaning that Figure 2 is therefore 
correctly ordered, i.e., from the scenario where bidders’ bid more aggressively and more 
dispersed in the top row (row with scoring +1), to more conservative bidding with more 
concentration in the bid values in the bottom row (row with scoring -1). 
Third, the covariance and correlation factors found in the covariance and correlation 
matrices outside the diagonal between the independent variables (X1= kw , X2= kt  and X3=
kg ) themselves are generally small. The only exception is the comparatively larger 0.271 
correlation between independent variables X1 and X3. This significant, but still moderately 
weak, correlation originates when auctioners implement BSF for a Best Value or multi-
attribute auction and they have the common habit of using high bid score weightings 
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(X1=+1) along with concave BSF gradients (X3=+1), as well as low bid score weightings 
(X1=-1) with convex BSF gradients (X3=+1); the first combination promotes bidding 
aggressiveness, whereas the second promotes bidding conservativeness. Nevertheless, the 
relatively small correlation factors suggests that, even though there is some combined effect 
of the three independent variables, they are expected to be minor, i.e., every variable 
depicts a relatively independent single component that affects bidding behavior. 
Conversely, it is worth highlighting that the regression analysis found the linearity 
assumption to be reasonably satisfied. However, as noted above, this was not necessarily 
because the correlations among variables analyzed behave linearly. The data has been 
organized into a three-level ordinal scale that does not provide any information for the 
possible development of underlying mathematical functions that might have been identified 
by working with continuous variables in a larger BSF database. This issue remains in need 
of further research. 
Fourth, Figure 4 shows the Q-Q plots of the standardized residuals for the four multiple 
linear regression analyses. As can be easily seen, most data fit a straight line, indicating that 
the residuals follow approximately a Normal distribution. 
 <Figure 4> 
Finally, the last step was to carry out an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) – summarized 
in Figure 5 – to test if the multiple regression linear coefficients ‘Mi’ values were 
significantly different from each other in order to rank the three independent variables (X1=
kw , X2= kt  and X3= kg ) by decreasing the order of importance. Initially, inspection of the 
coefficients M1’s, M2’s and M3’s values in Figure 3 revealed that M1> M2> M3 for Y1 and 
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Y2, and that M2> M1> M3 for Y3 and Y4, so the bid score weighting and ALBC width may 
be equally important, but both having more influence when compared to the BSF gradient. 
In particular, an ANOVA was carried out by studying the Fisher’s Least Significant 
Difference (LSD) intervals, which is a statistical method for comparing the means of 
several variables and does not require correction for multiple comparisons. The main 
results of this analysis are shown in Figure 5. 
<Figure 5> 
The major results from the ANOVA also indicated that both the bid score weighting 
and ALBC width are almost always more important than the BSF gradient (their Fisher 
LSD intervals rarely intersect), whereas the bid score weighting was not always more 
influential than the ALBC width (since their Fisher’s LSD intervals are partially overlapped 
for most Y variables). Therefore, the results of this latter analysis confirm that the variables 
bid score weighting, ALBC width and BSF gradient are already ranked in decreasing order 
of importance, but the first two almost always have a quite similar influence on bidder 
behavior. 
Summarizing, as said in the “Hypotheses”, the expectation was that the higher the bid 
scoring weighting (X1= kw ), the lower the bidders would bid, as they would have had less 
possibility of gaining any advantage through having a superior technical proposal. 
Similarly, when the ALBC is lenient (because it excludes very few bidders by a very large 
or even non-existent X2= kt  value), bidder behavior was expected to be more aggressive 
since there is less chance of being disqualified for bidding too low. Analogously, it was 
claimed that bidders who are close to the lowest (maximum drop) would be more likely to 
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compete strongly with concave BSF curves as they would feel that their score might be 
reduced even though their bids are quite similar. 
Hence, for example, it can be seen that BSF ID=6 from Table 1, with all the trichotomic 
variables set at -1 (low wk, narrow tk and convex gk), causes a higher level of bidding 
conservativeness and bid concentration as demonstrated by its small Y values from Table 3. 
Conversely, the traditional lowest-wins auction with no ALBC (∄ tk), which is perfectly 
concave and is actually represented by BSF ID=36 in Table 1, produces on average the 
largest  ,  ,   and  values in Table 3. That is, it generates the highest bidding 
aggressiveness and bid dispersion. This accords well with the literature concerning 
traditional bidding and the very raison d'être for the introduction of BSF and non-price 
features in general. 
 
Test of the Model 
For an additional check, several more recent auctions were gathered from the same country 
(Spain) where the original auctions for developing the Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
were collected. This new sub-dataset comprises a total of seven buildings and hydraulic 
civil work auctions from years 2009 and 2010 grouped under three sets of auctions with 
common BSF features in each of the three groups. Results of actual versus estimated  , 
 ,   and  values by using M0, M1, M2 and M3 values according to Figure 3 (left 
column) are presented in Table 4. 
<Table 4> 
As can be seen, per-unit deviations between actual and estimated values generally 
remain below 10%. However, there are two exceptions for   (the regression parameter that 
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specifies the linear relationship between do and dm) with deviations up to 20%. It must be 
noted however, that years 2009 and 2010 were the first officially considered in the 
economic recession in Spain; hence, it is expected that with equivalent cost estimates (do) 
the bidders bid more aggressively (lower mean bids, dm) compared to the previous period of 
2003-2008. However, these deviations were found only for the dependent variable Y1 ( ) , 
not for the other three (  ,   and  ). Therefore, overall, it can be considered as a highly 
satisfactory result. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
There are many scoring formulas currently in use for evaluating bid proposals in Best 
Value auctions. These affect bidder conservativeness-aggressiveness in profound ways but 
their design in practice is invariably a highly intuitive process, involving few theoretical or 
empirical considerations. To date, the vast literature of theoretical competitive models has 
relied almost exclusively on a combination of the foundational axioms of economics and 
intuition together with scarce experimental results that many perceive as being of uncertain 
veracity. The contribution here adds to the relatively tiny amount of complementary field 
studies in this area, providing some confidence in the theoretical developments so far. 
In this paper, an analysis aimed at bridging this gap through the empirical study of a 
sample of 131 Spanish procurement auctions is provided in order to establish the changes 
in bidding competitiveness that occur, at least partially, in response to the mathematical 
scoring rule chosen by the engineer in the auction specifications. In doing this, three major 
variables are hypothesized as being likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in 
terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of their 
25 
 
bids. These variables are the bid score weighting (how relatively important is the bid in 
contrast with the technical proposal), the ALBC measured by its width (how narrow is the 
cut-off that sets a threshold beyond which a bid is disqualified), and the BSF measured by 
its gradient (the concavity, linearity or convexity of the scoring curve that makes bidders 
realize how quickly their score decreases the more they exceed the lowest bid). For 
example, aggressive bidding is expected to occur with a high bid score weighting (hardly 
any non-price features allowed), no abnormal bid detection and a concave scoring curve. 
From this, it is easy to show that the traditional lowest-wins auction prompts the most 
aggressive behavior from bidders and, hence, all the negative outcomes associated with 
aggressive bidding. 
In terms of industry practice, the findings concern both the bidders and the entities that 
design and/or eventually award the auctions. On one hand, bidders can benefit from 
understanding how different BSF and ALBC mathematical configurations force them to 
submit more competitive price bids, that is, to renounce to higher profits for the sake of 
obtaining higher scores. Indeed, bidders who understand these effects even before their first 
bidding experience might gain a clear competitive edge over their rivals. 
On the other hand, the findings of the research indicate the potential for individual 
engineers or owners to control the aggressiveness of bidders’ bids to a level that strikes a 
desired balance between the monetary costs of under-competitiveness and the increased 
risk of problems associated with over-competitiveness. Previous research into optimal 
auction design is far from incorporating such practical issues as non-price features, 
unrealistic bid detection and actual individual auctioneer risk preferences. The conceptual 
framework developed in this paper, therefore, offers a potential means of doing this through 
the design of enhanced scoring formulas for individual engineers. In its present form, 
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however, the analysis is restricted to providing a general qualitative configuration. The next 
logical step is the development of a quantitative means of determining how small variations 
in the BSF mathematical expressions might affect the level of bidder aggressiveness and 
bid dispersion for a future Best Value auction. This could be done, for example, by 
unbalancing the importance of the bid versus the technical proposal, adjusting the ALBC 
width or just by implementing BSF curves with different levels of concavity/convexity. All 
this is with the intention of promoting an equilibrium between competitiveness and risk 
among bidders’ bids, since in public construction contract auctions, for instance, both 
practitioners and researchers are aware that overly conservative bidding tends to waste 
public funds (i.e., a situation in which bidders make unreasonably high profits when 
winning the auction), whereas overly aggressive bidding causes problems such as poor 
quality, prolonged construction duration and ‘false economy’, that are said to ruin the 
health of the entire industry in the long run (Drew and Skitmore 1997; Flanagan et al. 
2007). 
For future empirical research, the analysis needs to be repeated in other contexts in 
order to study whether the importance, and the order of importance, of the three variables 
identified influence bidder behavior to the same extent, regardless of other uncontrolled 
variables. Also needed is an examination of the indirect effects of scoring technical 
proposals. For instance, recent empirical studies have found that, whenever the score for 
technical proposals is increased, bidders are encouraged to be more innovative and hence 
more focused on cost savings (Pellicer et al. 2014), an issue that may also eventually be 
reflected in the monetary component of the auction. In addition, analysis of a much larger 
dataset would help measure quantitatively, and with higher accuracy, how the particular 
configuration of scoring rules influences bidder behavior in other industries. 
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Notation List 
The following variables are used in this paper. 
A   Maximum price possible to be submitted in a capped tender/auction 
babn  Abnormal bid threshold (expressed in money) 
bi  Bidder i’s bid (expressed in money) 
bm  Mean (average) bid (expressed in money) 
bmax  Maximum (highest) bid (expressed in money) 
bmin  Minimum (lowest) bid (expressed in money) 
bo  Estimated cost, expressed in bid (in money) 
dabn  Abnormal drop threshold (expressed in /1) 
di  Bidder i’s drop (expressed in /1) 
dm  Mean drop (average bid) (expressed in /1) 
dmax  Maximum drop (lowest bid) (expressed in /1) 
dmin  Minimum drop (highest bid) (expressed in /1) 
do  Estimated cost, expressed in drop (in /1) 
gk  Bid Scoring Formula curve gradient in auctions with the same BSF ID and 
converted into a X3 later (in trichotomic score) 
M0…M3 Multiple linear regression coefficients relating X1, X2 and X3 with each of the 
four Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4 independent variables. 
n  Number of auctions with the same combination with the same BSF and 
ALBC and engineer 
s  Bid standard deviation (expressed in money) 
Si  Score awarded to bidder i as a function of bi or di (expressed in /1) 
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Ti  Score awarded to bidder i as a function of its Technical proposal (in /1) 
tk  Abnormally low bids criterion (ALBC) width in auctions with the same BSF 
ID (expressed in /1) and converted into a X2 later (in trichotomic score) 
wk  Bid score weighting in auctions with the same BSF ID (expressed in /1) and 
converted into a X1 later (in trichotomic score) 
α  Regression parameter that specifies the parabolic relationship between dmax 
and dm in drops (or bmin and bm in bids) 
   Average of the n values of α with the same ID (k value), renamed later as -Y2 
β  Regression parameter that specifies the parabolic relationship between dmin 
and dm in drops (or bmax and bm in bids) 
   Average of the n values of β with the same ID (k value), renamed later as Y3 
γ  Regression parameter that specifies the mathematical relationship between σ 
and dm in drops (or s and bm in bids) 
   Average of the n values of γ with the same ID (k value), renamed later as Y4 
λ  Regression parameter that specifies the linear relationship between do and dm 
in drops (or bo and bm in bids) 
   Average of the n values of λ with the same ID (k value), renamed later as Y1 
σ Drop standard deviation (expressed in /1) 
Standard statistical variables, such the ones used in Figures 3 and 5 (e.g. R
2
, SE, F, t, df), 
are not displayed. 
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Figure 1: Scoring Parameter relationships in capped auctions 
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Score 
1X  
ESF Weight 
( kw ) 
2X  
ALBC width 
(
kt  ) 
3X  
ESF Gradient 
(
kg ) 
+1 
1
3
2  kw  
(The technical bid weighting is 
underrated) 
115.0  kt  
(lenient abnormally low bids 
criterion; cases with ∄ kt  included 
here) 
Concave  
 
(higher score loss near the best 
scored bidder) 
0 3
2
3
1  kw  
(Balance between the price bid and 
the technical bid weigting) 
15.005.0  kt  
(balanced abnormally low bids 
criterion) 
Constant  
 
(linearly proportional score loss 
from the best scored bidder) 
-1 3
10  kw  
(The price bid weighting is 
underrated) 
05.00  kt  
(extremely narrow abnormally low 
bids criterion) 
Convex  
 
(softer score loss near the best 
scored bidder) 
 
Figure 2: Trichotomic scoring of the three independent ESF variables kw , kt  and kg  
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Figure 3: Multiple linear regression analysis 
  
Coefficient λ 's Multiple Linear regression Y 1 = λ = M 0  + M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2  + M 3 *X 3
M 0  = 1.099 SE M 0  = 0.013 F Y -value  = 116.523 F fisher  (α=5%) 3.438 F Y -value  > F fisher (α=5%)  ? OK
M 1  = 0.193 SE M 1  = 0.018 t M 1 -value  = 10.910 ( with df 1  and df 2 ) t M 1 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
M 2  = 0.166 SE M 2  = 0.015 t M 2 -value  = 10.910 t student  (α=5%) 2.017 t M 2 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
M 3  = 0.122 SE M 3  = 0.018 t M 3 -value  = 6.959 ( with df=df 2 ) t M 3 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
R² = 0.890 SE Y  = 0.063 n = 47 df 1  = 3 df 2  = 43
Coefficient -α 's Multiple Linear regression Y 2 = -α = M 0  + M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2  + M 3 *X 3
M 0  = 0.613 SE M 0  = 0.009 F Y -value  = 182.709 F fisher  (α=5%) 3.438 F Y -value  > F fisher (α=5%)  ? OK
M 1  = 0.200 SE M 1  = 0.012 t M 1 -value  = 16.976 ( with df 1  and df 2 ) t M 1 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
M 2  = 0.117 SE M 2  = 0.010 t M 2 -value  = 11.526 t student  (α=5%) 2.017 t M 2 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
M 3  = 0.074 SE M 3  = 0.012 t M 3 -value  = 6.317 ( with df=df 2 ) t M 3 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
R² = 0.927 SE Y  = 0.042 n = 47 df 1  = 3 df 2  = 43
Coefficient β 's Multiple Linear regression Y 3 = β = M 0  + M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2  + M 3 *X 3
M 0  = 0.653 SE M 0  = 0.013 F Y -value  = 72.100 F fisher  (α=5%) 3.438 F Y -value  > F fisher (α=5%)  ? OK
M 1  = 0.162 SE M 1  = 0.018 t M 1 -value  = 9.032 ( with df 1  and df 2 ) t M 1 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
M 2  = 0.166 SE M 2  = 0.015 t M 2 -value  = 10.750 t student  (α=5%) 2.017 t M 2 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
M 3  = 0.038 SE M 3  = 0.018 t M 3 -value  = 2.117 ( with df=df 2 ) t M 3 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
R² = 0.834 SE Y  = 0.064 n = 47 df 1  = 3 df 2  = 43
Coefficient γ 's Multiple Linear regression Y 4 = γ = M 0  + M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2  + M 3 *X 3 →    Y 4 = γ = M 0  + M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2
M 0  = 0.146 SE M 0  = 0.004 F Y -value  = 19.202 F fisher  (α=5%) 3.438 F Y -value  > F fisher (α=5%)  ? OK
M 1  = 0.025 SE M 1  = 0.005 t M 1 -value  = 4.830 ( with df 1  and df 2 ) t M 1 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
M 2  = 0.027 SE M 2  = 0.004 t M 2 -value  = 6.091 t student  (α=5%) 2.017 t M 2 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? OK
M 3  = -0.004 SE M 3  = 0.005 t M 3 -value  = -0.749 ( with df=df 2 ) t M 3 -value  > t student (α=5%)  ? No
R² = 0.573 SE Y  = 0.019 n = 47 df 1  = 3 df 2  = 43
Covariance Matrix (CvM) Correlation Matrix (CrM)
X 1 X 2 X 3 X 1 X 2 X 3
X 1 0.302 -0.016 0.083 X 1 1.000 -0.048 0.271
X 2 -0.016 0.380 0.030 X 2 -0.048 1.000 0.088
X 3 0.083 0.030 0.309 X 3 0.271 0.088 1.000
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Figure 4: Normality test of Residuals (Q-Q plots)  
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Expected (Normal distr.) Y1= λ resid. Y2 =-α resid. Y3 = β resid. Y4 =γ resid.
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Figure 5: Least Significant Difference intervals analysis 
  
Coefficient λ 's M 1 , M 2  and M 3 's LSDs Y 1 = λ = M 0  + M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2  + M 3 *X 3
LB LSD intervals UP LSD intervals Observations:
M 1  = 0.193 SE M 1  = 0.018 s M 1  = 0.019 0.166 0.220 M 1 's and M 2 's LSD intervals intersect, as
M 2  = 0.166 SE M 2  = 0.015 s M 2  = 0.018 0.141 0.191 M 2 's with M 3 's. Hence, X 1 's M 1  value seems
M 3  = 0.122 SE M 3  = 0.018 s M 3  = 0.019 0.095 0.149 more important than X 3 's M 3  value.
n = 47 N = 141 t N-1 (α=5%)  = 1.977
Coefficient -α 's M 1 , M 2  and M 3 's LSDs Y 2 = -α = M 0  + M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2  + M 3 *X 3
LB LSD intervals UP LSD intervals Observations:
M 1  = 0.200 SE M 1  = 0.012 s M 1  = 0.016 0.178 0.222 No LSD intervals intersect,
M 2  = 0.117 SE M 2  = 0.010 s M 2  = 0.015 0.0964 0.138 then, X 1  is more important than X 2
M 3  = 0.074 SE M 3  = 0.012 s M 3  = 0.016 0.052 0.0958 and, X 2  is more important than X 3 .
n = 47 N = 141 t N-1 (α=5%)  = 1.977
Coefficient β 's M 1  and M 2 's LSDs Y 3 = β = M 0  + M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2  + M 3 *X 3
LB LSD intervals UP LSD intervals Observations:
M 1  = 0.162 SE M 1  = 0.018 s M 1  = 0.020 0.134 0.189 M 1 's and M 2 's LSD intervals intersect,
M 2  = 0.166 SE M 2  = 0.015 s M 2  = 0.018 0.140 0.191 then, X 1  and X 2  are equally important.
M 3  = 0.038 SE M 3  = 0.018 s M 3  = 0.019 0.010 0.065 Both are more important than X 3 .
n = 47 N = 141 t N-1 (α=5%)  = 1.977
Coefficient γ 's M 1  and M 2 's LSDs Y 4 = γ = M 0  + M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2  + M 3 *X 3 →    Y 4 = γ = M 0  +  M 1 *X 1  + M 2 *X 2
LB LSD intervals UP LSD intervals Observations:
M 1  = 0.025 SE M 1  = 0.005 s M 1  = 0.011 0.010 0.040 M 1 's and M 2 's LSD intervals intersect,
M 2  = 0.027 SE M 2  = 0.004 s M 2  = 0.010 0.014 0.041 then, X 1  and X 2  are equally important.
M 3  = -0.004 SE M 3  = 0.005 s M 3  = 0.010 -0.019 0.011 X 3  was deemed meaningless.
n = 47 N = 141 t N-1 (α=5%)  = 1.977
Cell Formulae
LB LSD intervals: Lower Bound of Fisher's Least Significant Difference Intervals LB = M i  - 0.707*t N-1 *s Mi
UB LSD intervals: Upper Bound of Fisher's Least Significant Difference Intervals UB = M i  + 0.707*t N-1 *s Mi
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Table 1: ESFs and ALBCs dataset 
40 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
ESF ID 
(k) 
Auction ID 
Upper Price 
limit (A) 
Auction ID 
Upper Price 
limit (A) 
n 
(∑Auction IDs) 
1 1 320,032.00 € 2 1,585,015.00 € 2 
Bidder 
(i) 
Bid (monetary 
value) (bi) 
Drop (/1 
value) (di) 
Bid (monetary 
value) (bi) 
Drop (/1 
value) (di)  
 Lowest = 1 173,361.33 € 0.458 683,152.58 € 0.569 
  2 198,419.84 € 0.380 767,798.23 € 0.516 
  3 201,620.16 € 0.370 810,121.06 € 0.489 
  4 204,820.48 € 0.360 852,443.89 € 0.462 
  5 208,020.80 € 0.350 871,758.25 € 0.450 
  6 211,221.12 € 0.340 871,758.25 € 0.450 
  7 216,021.60 € 0.325 894,766.72 € 0.435 
  8 217,621.76 € 0.320 935,158.85 € 0.410 
  9 221,587.19 € 0.308 937,089.54 € 0.409 
  10 224,022.40 € 0.300 951,009.00 € 0.400 
  11 230,423.04 € 0.280 979,412.37 € 0.382 
  12 279,227.92 € 0.128 1,014,409.60 € 0.360 
  13     1,021,735.20 € 0.355 
  Highest =14     1,233,349.34 € 0.222 
  
Scoring Parameters (SP) 
 
 do  0.235  0.358 
  dmax  0.458  0.569 
  dm  0.327  0.422 
  dmin  0.128  0.222 
  σ  0.066  0.072 
  Regression coefficients 
(calculated according to Figure 1, 2nd column) 
Averages 
λ  1.136  1.111   = 1.123 
α  0.599  0.602   = 0.601 
β  0.905  0.821   = 0.863 
γ  0.182  0.221   = 0.202 
Table 2: Example of ESF ID=1’s Regression Coefficient (, ,  and ) calculations 
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41 
 
ID 
(k) 
ESF Weight 
(wk) 
ALBC width 
(tk ) 
ESF Gradient 
(gk) 
X1 
f(wk) 
X2 
f(tk) 
X3 
f(gk) 
Y1 
( ) 
Y2 
(- ) 
Y3 
(  ) 
Y4 
( ) 
1 0.50 ∄ tk Convex 0 1 -1 1.123 0.601 0.863 0.202 
2 0.40 0.10 Convex 0 0 -1 1.070 0.589 0.561 0.140 
3 0.45 0.05 Constant 0 0 0 1.070 0.590 0.630 0.130 
4 0.50 0.05 Convex 0 0 -1 0.990 0.551 0.693 0.159 
5 0.30 0.06 Convex -1 0 -1 0.835 0.327 0.422 0.134 
6 0.30 0.04 Convex -1 -1 -1 0.641 0.227 0.291 0.104 
7 0.28 0.04 Constant -1 -1 0 0.703 0.278 0.329 0.076 
8 0.55 0.10 Constant 0 0 0 1.078 0.564 0.693 0.149 
9 0.40 0.10 Convex 0 0 -1 1.060 0.524 0.706 0.165 
10 0.40 0.10 Constant 0 0 0 1.100 0.651 0.634 0.140 
11 0.40 0.10 Constant 0 0 0 1.045 0.620 0.660 0.177 
12 0.30 0.10 Convex -1 0 -1 0.764 0.323 0.432 0.134 
13 0.30 ∄ tk Constant -1 1 0 1.082 0.541 0.728 0.131 
14 0.40 ∄ tk Constant 0 1 0 1.283 0.777 0.789 0.187 
15 0.50 ∄ tk Convex 0 1 -1 1.088 0.653 0.780 0.169 
16 1.00 0.10 Concave 1 0 1 1.448 0.892 0.865 0.191 
17 0.20 ∄ tk Convex -1 1 -1 0.884 0.459 0.644 0.165 
18 0.50 ∄ tk Convex 0 1 -1 1.088 0.614 0.764 0.173 
19 0.13 ∄ tk Constant -1 1 0 1.113 0.551 0.553 0.158 
20 0.40 ∄ tk Constant 0 1 0 1.170 0.706 0.780 0.205 
21 0.40 0.20 Constant 0 1 0 1.321 0.733 0.913 0.144 
22 0.45 ∄ tk Constant 0 1 0 1.346 0.696 0.913 0.153 
23 0.45 0.10 Convex 0 0 -1 0.940 0.551 0.620 0.150 
24 0.50 0.10 Constant 0 0 0 1.100 0.577 0.574 0.143 
25 0.35 0.10 Convex 0 0 -1 1.010 0.535 0.640 0.134 
26 0.50 ∄ tk Constant 0 1 0 1.346 0.696 0.888 0.189 
27 0.40 0.20 Constant 0 1 0 1.207 0.777 0.747 0.191 
28 0.30 ∄ tk Constant -1 1 0 1.050 0.530 0.585 0.129 
29 0.40 0.15 Convex 0 1 -1 1.100 0.700 0.730 0.180 
30 0.30 0.10 Constant -1 0 0 0.924 0.398 0.494 0.136 
31 0.35 0.10 Convex 0 0 -1 0.980 0.578 0.713 0.131 
32 0.40 0.10 Constant 0 0 0 1.034 0.632 0.667 0.167 
33 0.35 ∄ tk Convex 0 1 -1 1.229 0.719 0.706 0.178 
34 0.30 0.18 Constant -1 1 0 1.124 0.562 0.741 0.123 
35 0.40 ∄ tk Constant 0 1 0 1.283 0.681 0.822 0.158 
36 1.00 ∄ tk Concave 1 1 1 1.701 1.102 1.091 0.204 
37 0.51 0.10 Convex 0 0 -1 1.050 0.556 0.581 0.126 
38 0.35 0.10 Constant 0 0 0 1.034 0.651 0.693 0.155 
39 0.20 ∄ tk Convex -1 1 -1 0.941 0.464 0.592 0.173 
40 0.50 0.10 Constant 0 0 0 1.177 0.670 0.581 0.179 
41 0.40 ∄ tk Constant 0 1 0 1.245 0.733 0.813 0.178 
42 0.70 0.04 Constant 0 -1 0 0.930 0.535 0.500 0.114 
43 0.55 0.10 Constant 0 0 0 1.144 0.583 0.739 0.135 
44 0.70 0.10 Constant 1 0 0 1.081 0.667 0.623 0.128 
45 0.33 0.20 Constant -1 1 0 1.008 0.498 0.605 0.152 
46 0.30 ∄ tk Constant -1 1 0 1.040 0.498 0.676 0.128 
47 0.60 0.25 Constant 0 1 0 1.219 0.681 0.772 0.148 
Table 3: Analysis of ESFs  
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ID 
(k) 
Nº auctions 
(n) 
ESF description ESF Weight 
(wk) 
ALBC width 
(tk ) 
ESF Gradient 
(gk) 
1 3 
2
m
m
m 91
9101
1
6.0
1 









d
dd
d
S ii
 0.50 0.10 Convex 
2 2 
max
max
1
5.11
d
dd
S ii


  0.30 0.04 Constant 
3 2 
max
max
0
1
ddifS
ddifS
ii
ii


 1.00 0.10 Concave 
 
   Estimated  Actual  Deviations (/1) 
ID 
(k) 
X1 
f(wk) 
X2 
f(tk) 
X3 
f(gk) 
 Y1 
( ) 
Y2 
(- ) 
Y3 
(  ) 
Y4 
( ) 
 Y1 
( ) 
Y2 
(- ) 
Y3 
(  ) 
Y4 
( ) 
 Y1 
( ) 
Y2 
(- ) 
Y3 
(  ) 
Y4 
( ) 
1 0 0 -1  0.977 0.539 0.616 0.150  1.092 0.549 0.677 0.154  0.11 0.02 0.09 0.03 
2 -1 -1 0  0.740 0.296 0.326 0.093  0.888 0.287 0.334 0.087  0.17 0.03 0.02 0.07 
3 1 0 1  1.413 0.887 0.852 0.167  1.425 0.965 0.902 0.186  0.01 0.08 0.06 0.10 
Table 4: Validation of the Multiple Linear Regression expressions with a recent 
sub-set of auctions 
 
 
 
